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Abstract
Potentially dynamically-inconsistent individuals create particular problems for eco-
nomics, as their behaviour depends upon whether and how they attempt to resolve
their potential inconsistency. This paper reports on the results of a new experiment
designed to help us distinguish between the different types that may exist. We classify
people into four types: myopic, naive, resolute and sophisticated. We implement a
new and simple experimental design in which subjects are asked to take two sequen-
tial decisions (interspersed by a random move by Nature) concerning the allocation of
a given sum of money. The resulting data enables us to classify the subjects. We find
that the majority are resolute, a significant minority are sophisticated and rather few
are naive or myopic.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic consistency is a central assumption in economics, and is essential to many
of the key results and policy prescriptions in important fields, such as those of invest-
ment, saving and pensions. It implies that preferences do not change with the passage
of time: the preferences an individual has over choices in some period are not depen-
dent on themoment that the individual is asked to express these preferences. However,
there is ample evidence that people are not dynamically consistent. In the context of
discounting, it seems that many people do not discount exponentially; so that their
relative evaluation of consumption at two given points of time depend upon the time
at which the evaluation is being made. In the context of decision-making under risk,
it seems that many people do not have Expected Utility preferences; so that their risk
aversion about choices in some period vary depending upon the time at which their
risk evaluation is being made. As Wikipedia notes:
"In economics, dynamic inconsistency, or time inconsistency, describes a
situation where a decision-maker’s preferences change over time, such that
what is preferred at one point in time is inconsistent with what is preferred
at another point in time. It is often easiest to think about preferences over
time in this context by thinking of decision-makers as being made up of
many different "selves", with each self representing the decision-maker at a
different point in time. So, for example, there is my today self, my tomor-
row self, my next Tuesday self, my year from now self, etc. The inconsis-
tency will occur when somehow the preferences of some of the selves are
not aligned with each other."
While we are particularly concerned with decision making under risk, the issues are
also important in other contexts. Of crucial interest is in how such potentially dynam-
ically inconsistent people react to their potential inconsistency. Are they aware of it?
Do they ignore it? Do they take it into account in planning their future behaviour? Do
they somehow constrain themselves to act consistently?
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The literature (seminal references are Machina (1989) andMcClennan (1990)) discusses
a number of possibilities. The key issue is that dynamically inconsistent preferences
change through time. We give an example in the context of consumption, though our
context is decision-making under risk. As we have already noted, the crucial problem
with dynamically inconsistent preferences is that they change through time, not in the
sense that preferences for period t0 > t consumption are different from preferences for
period t consumption, but rather in the sense that preferences for period t0 consump-
tion as viewed from period t are different from preferences for period t0 consumption
as viewed from period t+ s, for some t0 > t+ s > t. It is as if the individual is a differ-
ent individual in different periods. In a sense it is a type of schizophrenia, but one that
is familiar. The interesting issues from the point of view of economics are twofold: (1)
is the individual aware of this dynamic inconsistency?; (2) if so, what does he or she
do about it?
If the individual is not aware of the dynamic inconsistency, then presumably the in-
dividual works through time always choosing the best decision as viewed from the
present perspective. We call such a type naive. This is the first of four types of decision
maker we consider. If, however, the individual is aware of his or her dynamic inconsis-
tency, there are various things that he or she might do about it. The individual could
follow the example of Ulysses (about to be confronted by the sirens) by metaphorically
binding himself to the mast – by imposing his first period preferences. Such a person
has been described by McClennan (1990) and Machina (1989) as resolute. This is the
second of our types.
Economists usually, however, adopt a different story: they assume that potentially
dynamically inconsistent people realise that they will want to change their minds in
the future, and anticipate this behaviour ex ante. Such people backwardly induct. Indeed
this is the prevailing model used in economics. It is as if Ulysses decided to travel
home by a different route. This is our third type: it is referred to in the literature as
sophisticated.
In Hey and Lotito (2009) these three types were investigated. In this paper we add to
the menu a fourth type, one which naturally arises in the context of our experiment,
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and for which it appears that many real-world examples can be found. This type is one
who simply assumes that the decision in the present will be the last. We call this type
myopic.
The answers to the questions posed above are important not only for economic theory
but also for public policy. For example, if people are myopic, then the state might feel
obliged to take action to ensure adequate pensions for the population. It is to these
issues that this paper is addressed.
We adopt a particularly simple experimental design which enables us to shed light on
these issues, and to discriminate between the different types. It is simpler and more
informative than a design that was used in Hey and Lotito (2009). We describe the new
design in the next section. We then define the various types of economic agent and
discuss how they should behave in this experiment. We then describe our econometric
analyses and then present our results. A final section concludes.
2 The experimental design and some theory
The design was inspired by one pioneered by Loomes (1991) and subsequently ex-
tended by Choi et al. (2007). This design was developed for a different decision prob-
lem in a different context. In the Loomes’ design subjects were simply asked to allocate
a sum of money between two risky alternatives. Choi et al. extended the design by en-
dowing subjects with tokens and having different exchange rates between tokens and
money for the different alternatives. We do not use that feature but extend the Loomes
design in a different direction by having a dynamic allocation problem. In our design,
subjects are presented with a set of N decision problems, all with the same two-stage
structure. In each problem, subjects are given a sum of money, m, to allocate between
two probabilistic options 1 and 2, with known and stated probabilities. Suppose the
allocations are x to 1 and m  x to 2. Then Nature chooses one of the options at ran-
dom. If Nature chooses 1 the subject is then asked to allocate x (the amount allocated
to 1 at the first stage) between two further probabilistic options, 1A and 1B, again with
known and stated probabilities; call the allocations y and x   y. Similarly, if Nature
3
chooses 2 the subject is then asked to allocate m  x (the amount allocated to 2 at the
first stage) between two further probabilistic options, 2A and 2B, again with known
and stated probabilities; call the allocations z and m  x  z. Then Nature chooses one
of these new options at random.
If Nature chooses 1 at the first stage and 1A at the second, then the subject earns y
for that particular problem; similarly if Nature chooses 1 at the first and 1B at the
second, then the subject earns x   y; if Nature chooses 2 at the first and 2A at the
second, then the subject earns z; and finally if Nature chooses 2 at the first and 2B at
the second, then the subject earns m  x   z. At the end of the experiment one of the
decision problems is chosen at random and the subject is paid his or her earnings on
that particular problem.
The design is simple and informative. To illustrate how the design discriminates be-
tween different types of potentially dynamically inconsistent people, let us assume that
the decision-maker has Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) preferences, with
utility function u(.) and weighting function w(.). As is well-known, if w(p) = p then
the model reduces to that of Expected Utility (EU) theory and the decision-maker is
not dynamically inconsistent. However suppose that w(.) is not linear. Then potential
dynamic inconsistencies arise.
Consider the problem as viewed from when the decision-maker must make the first
decision. Let us denote the probabilities of Nature choosing 1 and 2 at the first stage by
p and (1  p) respectively. Denote the probabilities of Nature choosing 1A and 1B by
p1 and (1  p1) respectively, and denote the probabilities of Nature choosing 2A and
2B by p2 and (1  p2) respectively. The decision maker has to allocate m between 1 (x)
and 2 (m   x) at the first stage and then allocate whichever of x or m   x is realised
between either 1A (y) and 1B (x  y) or between 2A and 2B (z) and 2 (m  x  z) at the
second stage. Thus, as viewed from the first stage, the decision-maker has to choose x,
y and z to maximise his or her Rank Dependent Expected Utility. The possible payoffs
are y, x   y, z and m   x   z and the corresponding probabilities are pp1, p(1  p1),
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(1  p)p2 and (1  p)(1  p2). For the readers’ ease, let us introduce the notation
q1 = pp1, q2 = p(1  p1), q3 = (1  p)p2, q4 = (1  p)(1  p2),
together with the following one
m1 = y, m2 = x  y, m3 = z, m4 = m  x  z.
Naturally we have q1 + q2 + q3 + q4 = 1 and m1 + m2 + m3 + m4 = m. The Rank
Dependent EU evaluation of this risky prospect depends upon the ordering of the mj
(j = 1, 2, 3, 4). Suppose we consider the following ranking1
m1  m2  m3  m4 (1)
Then the objective function of the individual is to maximise the following expression
RDEU = u (m1) [1  w(q2 + q3 + q4)] + (2)
u (m2) [w(q2 + q3 + q4)  w(q3 + q4)] +
u (m3) [w(q3 + q4)  w(q4)] +
u (m4)w(q4)
The decisionmaker should choosem1,m2,m3 andm4 subject tom1+m2+m3+m4 = m
and to the ranking constraint (1) to maximise this expression. Denote by m1 ,m

2 ,m

3
and m4 the optimal values. The decision maker therefore allocates m

1 +m

2 to option 1
and the residual to option 2.
The potential dynamic inconsistency arises when the decisionmaker gets to the second
stage. Suppose that Nature chooses 1. The decision-maker has m1 +m

2 to allocate to
1A and 1B at this second stage. If the decision-maker reconsiders the problem at this
stage, and considers how to allocate this sum between options 1A and 1B at this sec-
ond stage in order to maximise his or her Rank Dependent Expected Utility as viewed
1Here we illustrate only one case of a possible ranking. Of course, in our analysis we consider all
possible rankings.
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from that point, his or her problem is to choose m1 and m2 to maximise the following
expression subject to m1 +m2 = m1 +m

2
u (m1) [1  w(1  p1)] + u (m2) [w(1  p1)] if m1  m2 (3)
u (m1)w(p1) + u (m2) [1  w(p1)] if m2  m1
Let us call m1 and m

2 the optimal values. We note that they both depend on m

1+ m

2 .
But there is no reason why the m1 and m

2 need to be equal to the m

1 and m

2 . This
is only guaranteed to be the case if w(.) is linear – that is, if the preferences are EU,
and hence the individual is not potentially dynamically consistent. We will provide an
explicit example of this in what follows.
Similarly if Nature had chosen option 2 at the first stage then the problem at the second
stage is to choosem3 andm4 to maximise the following expression subject tom3+m4 =
m3 +m4
u (m3) [1  w(1  p2)] + u (m4) [w(1  p2)] if m3  m4 (4)
u (m3)w(p2) + u (m4) [1  w(p2)] if m4  m3
Let us call m3 and m4 the optimal values. Again, there is no reason why these need
to be equal to the m3 and m4 . As before, this is only guaranteed to be the case if w(.)
is linear – that is, if the preferences are EU, and hence the individual is not potentially
dynamically consistent.
The issue now is what the individual does about this potential inconsistency. One
possibility is that the individual simply uses the optimal allocations derived at the first
stage. We call such an individual resolute. A second possibility is that the individual
implements, at the second stage, those allocations which appear optimal at this second
stage. We call this type of individual naive, because at the first stage, he or she did not
take into account the fact that he or she would choose differently at the second stage.
However, this latter behaviour might be considered irrational. Consider instead an
individual who anticipates that, when he or she arrives at the second stage, will re-
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optimise at that point. In this case, the individual will solve the decision problem in
two steps. First, taking as given an allocation of money between option 1 and 2, say m1
andm2, he or she choosesm1,m2,m3 andm4 to maximize his or her second stage RDEU
function. Denote by m1 (m1),m

2 (m1),m

3 (m2) and m

4 (m2) the optimal values,
where the notationmakes clear the dependence on the given allocation (m1,m2). Given
these values, in the second step the decision maker chooses m1 and m2 subject to m1 +
m2 = m to maximize2
RDEU = u (m1 (m1)) [1  w(q2 + q3 + q4)] +
u (m2 (m1)) [w(q2 + q3 + q4)  w(q3 + q4)] +
u (m3 (m2)) [w(q3 + q4)  w(q4)] +
u (m4 (m2))w(q4)
Here we emphasise that the second-step decisions depend upon the values chosen in
the first step. Such a decision-maker is termed in the literature sophisticated.
The final type of individual we consider is one who ignores the second stage decision
and decides at the first assuming that the outcome at the first stage will in fact be
the actual payment. Such an individual chooses (m1 + m2) and (m3 + m4) subject to
(m1 +m2) + (m3 +m4) = m to maximise the expression below
u (m1 +m2) [1  w(1  p)] + u (m3 +m4) [w(1  p)] if m1 +m2  m3 +m4
u (m1 +m2)w(p) + u (m3 +m4) [1  w(p)] if m3 +m4  m1 +m2
Denote by (m1 +m2) and (m3 +m4) the optimal values. The decision maker there-
fore allocates (m1 +m2) to option 1 and the residual to option 2 at the first stage. At
the second stage, he or she then allocates the residual money either as in equation (3),
if Nature chooses 1 at the first stage and as in equation (4) if Nature chooses 2.
The essential point is that different types – resolute, naive, sophisticated and myopic –
do different things. This fact enables us to discriminate between the types and hence
2Here we are implicitly assuming the ranking as in (1).
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identify the type of each individual. This is the purpose of the experiment. Identi-
fying the type is important, as different types behave differently. Usually, economic
theory assumes sophisticated behaviour: this requires quite elaborate planning. We
test whether subjects actually do this, and if not, what they actually do.
3 The experimental implementation
The implementation was exactly as above. Subjects were given written instructions (in
the Non-Mathematical Appendix) and then they were presented with 27 problems, all
with the same structure, and all with the same amount of money (e40 in the experi-
ment though £40 in the screen shots) to be allocated, but with different probabilities in
the various problems. An example of the opening screen-shot of a problem is shown in
Figure 1. We used the words ‘Left’ and ‘Right’, rather than Options 1 and 2, because of
the physical layout of the problem on the screen. In the problem pictured in Figure 1,
the probability of Nature moving Left at the first stage is 60% and that of moving Right
40%. In this particular problem, if Nature chooses Left after the first decision, then the
probability of Nature moving Left (Right) after the second is 70% (30%); whereas if Na-
ture chooses Right after the first decision, then the probability of Nature moving Left
(Right) after the second is 60% (40%). We note that this, and the other screen-shots, is
in English, though the experiment itself was conducted in Italian, at CESARE, the Cen-
tro di Economia Sperimentale A Roma Est, at LUISS in Rome. This first screen gives
information about probabilities and the sum to allocate.
Then the subject is asked to allocate the £40 (e40 in the actual experiment) between
Left and Right at this first stage. Figure 2 illustrates. The allocation when the screen is
first displayed is decided at random by the computer. As will be seen, there is a slider
on the screen and the subject can use this to show his or her preferred allocation. The
subject then clicks on “Click to Continue” to see what Nature decides at this first stage
and to proceed to the second stage. (We should note that we forced the subjects to wait
45 seconds before the “Click to Continue” button appeared on the screen.)
The random move by Nature was played out in a visually appealing and convincing
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way. Suppose in this problem Nature chose Left and the preferred allocation of the
subject was that in Figure 2. Then the subject would have £25 (e25 in the experiment)
to allocate at the second stage. The second stage screen would then open as in Figure
3. Once again, the opening allocation of the £25 (e25 in the experiment) is decided
at random by the computer. Again the subject can use the slider to indicate his or
her preferred allocation, and click on the “Click to Continue” button (which appeared
after 15 seconds) to confirm his or her allocation. Once again the random move by
Nature and the subject’s payoff for that problem was displayed on the screen. This
procedure was repeated for all 27 problems, which appeared in a random order, with
Left and Right at both stages randomly ordered. At the end of all 27 problems, one of
the problemswas chosen at random and the subject paid the outcome on that particular
problem.
Before we ran the experiment we carried out intensive simulations to ensure that we
had a number of problems that would enable us to discriminate between the various
types. The actual set of problems is listed in Table 1. As we have already noted, the
order of the problems and the left/right juxtaposition were determined at random.
We should perhaps comment briefly on the simulations that we carried out and the
resulting sets of problems that we used. Obviously in choosing the problem set, there
is a trade-off: in general the more problems we include, the greater the discrimina-
tory power of the experiment; however, with too many problems, there is the danger
that the subjects can become tired or bored and hence lose concentration. Also there is
the problem, given our incentive mechanism, that, as we increase the number of prob-
lems, the incentive for careful responses on the part of the subjects on each problem
decreases. We also wanted to keep the probabilities3 simple, and hence we decided to
have all probabilities multiples of 1/10. Finally we wanted to avoid too high or too
low probabilities, as the information we would gather from their choices on problems
with very high or very low probabilities would be small. We therefore decided to have
at each stage probabilities of 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8. We then constructed all possible combina-
tions for these three probabilities over the values p, p1 and p2. Hence the 27 problems.
3Note that we did not use the word ’probability’ in the experiment, preferring to use the more every-
day word ’chance’.
9
At this stage we carried out simulations to see if these 27 problems would be suffi-
ciently discriminating. Obviously the discriminating power depends upon the actual
values of the parameters. We shall return to our simulations after we have discussed
our parameterisation in the next section.
4 Estimation and identification of types
Our analysis is by subject, as subjects are clearly different. Our procedure was the
following. For each subject, we assumed that they had Rank Dependent Expected
Utility preferences4. We also assumed that they had a CRRA utility function, written
in this particular way5
u(m) =
8><>:
m1  1r  1
1  1r
for r 6= 1
ln(m) for r = 1
(5)
We note the special case when the parameter r takes the value 1. In this case the utility
function becomes logarithmic.
The reason for this slightly non-standard (but equivalent to the usual) parameterisa-
tion is simply that it makes the mathematics more elegant and hence some key results
more transparent. For example, the solution to the optimal allocation of an amount
m between four options with probabilities p1, p2, p3 and p4 for an individual with EU
preferences and the above utility function is given by
mi =
mpri
∑4j=1 p
r
j
for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (6)
We once again note the importance of the special case when r = 1 (and thus when
the utility function is logarithmic). In this case optimal allocations are simply propor-
tional to the probabilities. This special case is identical to the simple heuristic (which
psychologists have noted in other contexts) by which subjects simply allocate money
proportional to the probabilities. Obviously this simple heuristic and optimising with
a logarithmic utility function are observationally indistinguishable in our context.
4This is the most widely-accepted non-EU preference functional in the literature. It contains EU as a
special case.
5See Wakker (2008) for an excellent discussion of the properties of this utility function.
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This parameterisation also helps makes clear why an EU individual is not dynamically
inconsistent. From equation (6) it follows that the optimal allocations as viewed from
the first stage are proportional to pr1, p
r
2, p
r
3 and p
r
4. Suppose the individual arrives at
the second stage, for concreteness after Nature has chosen option 1. If the individual
wishes to reconsider his or her choices at this stage, he or she will solve the following
problem
max
m01,m
0
2
p1u(m01) + p2u(m
0
2) s.t. m
0
1 +m
0
2 = m1 +m2,
where m1 and m2 are given by (6). Given (5), the solution to this problem is
m0i =
pri (m1 +m2)
pr1 + p
r
2
=
mpri
∑4j=1 p
r
j
for i = 1, 2,
thus showing m0i = mi for i = 1, 2 and similarly for i = 3, 4. Hence consistency is
guaranteed, though this is the case for all EU decision-makers, not just those with a
CRRA utility function.
The parameterisation that we have adopted implies similar notational simplifications
for the RDEU model. For example, the optimal allocations for a resolute RDEU indi-
vidual are given by
mi =
mvri
∑4j=1 v
r
j
for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (7)
Here the vi are functions of the pi which depend on the form of the weighting function
w(.), whose actual value depend on the ranking considered. On this latter, see below.
The optimal solutions for all four types are given in Mathematical Appendix 1.
To specify fully the RDEU preferences we need also specify the weighting function. We
assume that this takes the Quiggin (1982) form6
w(p) =
pg
(pg + (1  p)g) 1g
(8)
For RDEU individuals the optimal allocations depend upon the type. Table 2 gives an
example – a RDEU individual with r = 2.0 and g = 0.6. This person is moderately
6To be strictly correct, we should attribute this to Tversy and Kahneman (1992), who proposed this
variation on the original specification proposed by Quiggin, namely: w(p) = pg/[pg + (1  p)g].
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risk-averse and has the S-shaped weighting function shown in Figure 4; this person
over-weights small decumulative probabilities and under-weights large ones. It will
be seen from Table 2 that the different types do indeed take different decisions.
In order to estimate the best-fitting values of r and g for each type of subject, and hence
identify the best-fitting type for each subject, we need to make some assumption about
the stochastic structure of the data. This is necessary because subjects’ behaviour is
noisy – there is a stochastic component to the data. Because the optimal decisions
(see Mathematical Appendix 1) imply given values for the ratio between the optimal
allocation and the amount to allocate, it is natural to make some assumption about the
empirical counterpart: the ratio between the actual amount allocated and the actual
amount to allocate. Obviously this is a proportion and therefore lies between 0 and 1.
The natural statistical distribution to assume is thus the Beta distribution. A random
variable R with such a distribution satisfies 0  R  1, and has two parameters –
which we denote generically by α and β. The mean is given by αα+β and the variance
by αβ
(α+β)(α+β+1) . An interesting property is that, if we want
E(R) = R and var(R) = R
(1  R)
s
(9)
to be satisfied for some value of s, then we should put α = R(s   1) and β = (1 
R)(1  s). Here the parameter s is an indicator of the precision of the distribution of
R. From equation (9) it can be seen that the variance of R tends to zero as s tends to
infinity or as R tends to either 0 or 1.
We assume that each empirical proportion (the proportion of m allocated to 1; the pro-
portion of x allocated to 1A if Nature chooses 1; and the proportion of (m  x) allocated
to 2A if Nature chooses 2) has such a Beta distribution. Moreover we assume that the
parameters of each of these three distributions are such that the means and variances
are given by equation (9) where R is the corresponding optimal proportion. Note in
passing the usefulness of the property that the variance of R tends to zero as R tends
to either 0 or 1: this implies that if it is optimal to allocate all or nothing, then subjects
do not make a mistake. Details are given in Mathematical Appendix 2.
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Let us now briefly return to our pre-experimental simulations, as the properties of
these simulations may qualify our results. As we have already noted, the power of
our experiment in discriminating between the various types depends upon the actual
parameters of the subjects. Clearly if the parameter g is close to 1, the discriminatory
power is bound to be low – since with such a parameter the subject is close to being EU
and hence there will be little differences between the behaviours of the various types.
Instead we report here the results of a simulation with a g value of 0.8 (a moderately
non-EU subject), an r value of 2.0 (a moderately risk-averse subject) and an s value of
75 (representing modest, and not untypical, precision). These are, in fact, the parame-
ter values for the best-fitting type of subject 65, whose results we discuss in the next
section and report in Table 4. We carried out 100 simulations of a subject with these
parameters; on each iteration estimating all 16 combinations   each of the 4 true types
combined with each of the 4 estimated types   and calculating for each of these 16
combinations the maximised log-likelihood. Ideally the highest log-likelihood would
always be when the estimated type is the same as the true type, which would imply
that the estimation would always identify the true type. This was not always the case
as we discuss below. However, it is true that the averagemaximised log-likelihood is al-
ways greater for the true type, as Table 3.1 shows. Indeed, the highest values are along
the diagonal. Table 3.2 reports the standard deviations of the log-likelihoods over the
100 iterations. With perfect discrimination these standard deviations would be small.
In fact, they are reasonably so. More importantly, Table 3.3 reports the numbers of
times (out of the 100 iterations) where an incorrect type has the highest maximised
log-likelihood. It will be seen that incorrect identification occurs essentially when the
true type is the myopic type. In this case, the ’best’ type is incorrectly identified as
naive 17% of the time, as resolute 12% of the time and as sophisticated just 1% of the
time. However, a true naive or resolute type is always correctly identified and a true
sophisticated type 97% of the time. These results should be keep in mind when inter-
preting the results that follow.
There is one final point about the estimation that we shouldmention before we proceed
to the results. The above discussion has assumed that the decision variables are con-
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tinuous. In the experiment, subjects were forced to choose integer values at all stages.
This implies that if the optimal decision is, for example, x, and the decision variable
including error is x, then the value indicated by the subject is the nearest integer to
x. This has important consequences, in that when the subject chooses, for example to
allocate nothing then the decision variable (including the error) is not necessarily zero
but some number less than or equal to 0.5. The estimation program takes this into
account.
We proceed subject by subject as we believe that subjects are different and because we
want to see how many of each type there are. We fit the above model (RDEU with
CRRA utility function and Quiggin weighting function combined with a Beta distrib-
ution stochastic specification) to each subject individually, for each of the four types of
individuals. We used GAUSS’s maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the para-
meters7. We thus get, for each subject and for each type estimates of the parameters
r, g and s. We also obtain a maximised log-likelihood for each type. This enables us to
identify, for each subject, the best-fitting type.
5 Results
There were 71 subjects in our experiment8. The full estimates are available online9, but
it may be helpful to give an example here. This is subject number 65.
Type estimate of r estimate of g estimate of s log-likelihood
Myopic 1.600 1.000 26.364 -119.180
Naive 1.681 0.940 26.960 -118.426
Resolute 1.966 0.797 72.770 -91.675
Sophisticated 1.630 0.950 21.424 -123.947
The log-likelihood is largest for the Resolute type. For this type the estimate of the
parameter s, which can be interpreted as the precision of the Beta distribution gener-
7The program is at www-users.york.ac.uk/jdh1/hey and panaccione/mnrs.est
8Called, using the ORSEE (Greiner 2004) software, from the register of CESARE. The majority of the
subjects were students from LUISS.
9The full output from the estimation program can be found at www-users.york.ac.uk/jdh1/hey
and panaccione/mnrs.out
14
ating the stochastic component of behaviour, is large – suggesting that errors had a
low magnitude. The estimate of the g parameter for the Resolute is 0.797   which can
be shown to be significantly different from 110. Table 4 shows how well the various
models fit the data.
We now concentrate on the overall results. These aggregate results are summarised in
Table 5. We begin our discussion of this table with the three left-hand columns, headed
“All subjects”. In the first of these three columns we simply allocate the subjects to
the four types on the basis of the highest maximised log-likelihood. On this basis, we
classify 39 (55%) as resolute, 16 (23%) as sophisticated, 9 (13%) as naive and 7 (10%)
as myopic. Hence it would appear that more than one-half are resolute, around a quar-
ter sophisticated, and just one-fifth naive or myopic. However, one might legitimately
want to ask whether the fit is significantly better for one of the types; that is, whether
themaximised log-likelihood is significantly higher for the best-fitting type. To this end,
we carried out Clarke tests11. The results are given in the second and third columns of
Table 5. It will be seen that if we require significance at 5% then 35 (49%) of the subjects
do not have any type with a log-likelihood significantly better than all the others; and
if we require significance at 1% then 49 (69%) cannot be classified. However, of those
classified at the 5% level, 61% are resolute, 17% are sophisticated, 17% myopic and 6%
are naïve; at the 1% level the corresponding figures are 77%, 14%, 9% and 0%. There is
increasing evidence of resolute behaviour amongst those classified.
At this stage we should remember that people with EU preferences can not be dynam-
ically inconsistent. In a sense we have already carried out an indirect test of whether
subjects are EU or not in the above analysis: if an individual is EU then the four types
10In order to constrain the parameters to be within the appropriate bounds, the GAUSS program
transformed the parameters before estimation. The raw estimated parameters and their standard errors
are given in the following table:
Parameter r g s
myopic raw estimates -1.129 -0.916 -2.710
standard errors of myopic raw estimates 0.226 0.369 0.222
naive raw estimates -1.033 -1.138 -2.685
standard errors of naive raw estimates 0.136 0.212 0.222
resolute raw estimates -0.727 -1.811 -1.524
standard errors of resolute raw estimates 0.064 0.089 0.255
sophisticated raw estimates -1.093 -1.099 -2.944
standard errors of sophisticated raw estimates 0.177 0.290 0.216
11See Clarke (2007). An alternative test is the Vuong test, though Clarke shows that his test is more
powerful.
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should fit the data approximately equally well, and thus one type should not fit sig-
nificantly better than the others. However, there is an obvious direct test: whether
the estimated parameter g of the weighting function is significantly different from 112.
Obviously this is a different test, and we cannot expect the direct and indirect tests
necessarily to agree. Nevertheless, we report in the final three columns of Table 5, an
analysis of the data restricted to those subjects for whom the g parameter was signif-
icantly different from 1 at the 5% level for the best-fitting type. There were 35 (49%)
of such subjects. Of these, the highest maximised log-likelihood was for the resolute
type for 24 (69%) of the subjects, for the sophisticated type for 7 (20%), for the naive
type for 2 (6%) and for the myopic type for 2 (6%). Finally, if we carry out Clarke
tests for these 35 subjects with g parameters significantly different from 1, we find that:
at 5%, 11 are unclassifiable and of the 24 that are classifiable, 18 (75%) are resolute,
4 (17%) sophisticated, 2 (8%)myopic and 0 naïve; and that at 1%, 19 are unclassifiable
and of the 16 that are classifiable, 14 (87%) are resolute, 2 (13%) sophisticated, and
none is myopic or naïve. Once again there is increasing evidence of resolute behaviour
amongst those classified.
Before concluding we should express a note of caution. Our simulation results showed
that genuinely myopic subjects might be mis-classified as naive or resolute. As we
have very identified very few as naive but rather a lot as resolute, it may be the case
that some of those identified as resolute might in fact be myopic. However, our sim-
ulation results show that this happened rather rarely – just 12% of the time according
to our simulation results13. So there might be slightly fewer resolute and slightly more
myopic than our results show. But this does not really change the core conclusion:
there seem to be a lot of resolute people out there.
6 Conclusions
This paper has been concerned with dynamic inconsistency. The issue is important in
any economic analysis of behaviour through time. In a sense, this includes all types
12Recall that if g = 1 then the RDEU model reduces to EU.
13Though the precise figure does depend upon the parameter values.
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of economic behaviour, and includes particularly important examples such as saving,
investment and pension decisions. Typically economists employ backward induction
as their modelling of dynamic behaviour. Alternative methods include the strategy
method, wherein the decision-maker is conceived as of considering all possible strate-
gies and choosing the best one. Backward induction can be considered computation-
ally simpler, as the dimensionality of the strategy method can be formidable, and per-
haps beyond most decision-makers’ capability. Nevertheless the backward induction
method does implicitly assume that the decision-maker can project him or herself for-
ward to the final decision node and then backwardly induct from there. Again this is
computationally intense.
If the decision-maker is dynamically consistent, then these two methods lead to the
same solution. However, for dynamically inconsistent people, the two methods may
lead to different solutions. The root cause of this result is that dynamically inconsistent
people have different preferences at different points of time, and hence what appears
to be optimal depends upon the point from which one is viewing the problem. There
seems to be no right or wrongway to decide which is the best way to solve the problem
  simply because the preferences of a dynamically inconsistent person change through
time. It is exactly as if the individual is schizophrenic. Who is to say which are the true
preferences of the individual?
In the context of decision-making under risk, dynamic consistency is equivalent to hav-
ing Expected Utility preferences, while (potential) dynamic inconsistency is equivalent
to having non-EU preferences, for example Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU)
preferences.
For potentially dynamically inconsistent individuals, since normative analysis seems
impossible, all we can do is carry out a descriptive analysis and see what such people
actually do. This is the objective of this paper. We classify subjects in our experiment
into different types. These different types have different ways of reacting to their dy-
namic inconsistency. Following the literature, we considered three types: naive (who
simply ignore their inconsistency); resolute (who somehow impose their first period
preferences on their future selves); and sophisticated (who plan in the present taking
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into account what they know they will do in the future). We also add a fourth type,
myopic, who act as if each period is the last. We note that sophisticated types back-
wardly induct.
We consider the simplest type of dynamic decision problem  onewith just two stages.
In principle our method can be applied to more complex problems. We adopt an ex-
perimental method pioneered by Loomes (1991) in which subjects are asked to allocate
some quantity of money between two risky alternatives. We extend the method to a
dynamic decision problem in which the allocation is done in two stages, at each of
which there are two risky alternatives. The subject allocates money between two al-
ternatives. Then Nature moves and the subject then has to allocate the money that
Nature’s move implies between two further risky alternatives. Then Nature moves
again and the subject earns the money that Nature’s move implies. In our experiment,
subjects were asked to repeat this decision-problem on 27 different problems, all with
different probabilities for Nature’s moves.
The data enables us to see which type subjects are. For each subject we assume RDEU
preferences (which reduce to EU as a special case) with a CRRA utility function and
with a Quiggin weighting function. Two parameters are involved to describe the pref-
erences: the risk aversion parameter r of the CRRA utility function and the weighting
parameter g of the weighting function. If g is 1 then the individual has EU preferences
and thus is not dynamically inconsistent. In addition we need to estimate the precision
of the probability distribution describing the noisiness of their implementation of their
optimal strategy. We estimate each type separately and see which type fits best   that
is, which describes best the decisions of the subject.
If we start with all subjects, we see that the resolute type is the best for 55% of our 71
subjects, with 23% sophisticated, 13%myopic and 10% naive. If we restrict attention to
those subjects for whom the best-fitting model is significantly better than the others at
the 5% (1%) level , using the Clarke test, we find that of the 36 (22) for which this is true,
61% (77%) are resolute, 17% (14%) are sophisticated, 17% (9%) are myopic and 6% (0%)
are naive. If we further confine ourselves to those 35 subjects who are significantly not
EU (that is, those for whom the g parameter is significantly different from 1 at the 5%
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level), overall we observe 69% resolute, 20% sophisticated, 6% naive and 6% myopic.
So, the bottom line is that the majority of our dynamically inconsistent subjects are res-
olute, a significant minority are sophisticated; and rather few are naive or myopic. The
fact that we have very few naive or myopic is good news for economic theory and pol-
icy. We are, however, rather surprised by the preponderance of resolute types. It could
be argued that our experimental software is such that it encourages resolute behaviour,
but we see no reason why that is so. We did not ask subjects to state, at the first stage,
what amounts they wished to allocate to each of the four possible outcomes (1A, 1B,
2A and 2B), and indeed it was rather the opposite. Perhaps the statement of the prob-
abilities in the form of Figure 1 encouraged them to think about these final outcomes,
but note that the software did not tell them the probabilities of 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B. On
the contrary, the problem was very much stated in a sequential way. Indeed, it could
be argued that the software actually discouraged resolute play.
We would like to extend the experiment in two ways. The first is straightforward:
to run the experiment with a random sample from some population, since it might
be argued that student subjects are not representative of the population as a whole14.
Second, we would like to run the same experiment with more than two stages, and
perhaps with endowments of money every period. In this way, we would get closer to
a savings problem. The problem then is in calculating the optimal strategies for each
type of subject. Even with just two periods it is computationally difficult. However,
one needs to calculate the optimal strategies in order to distinguish between the types.
With just two stages, we think that we have been successful – and have a conclusion
that is rather surprising. If the majority of people are resolute, then state intervention
may be less necessary. That is, of course, if the first period preferences are the true
ones. But who knows?
14Though it might be argued that non-students are likely to be even more resolute.
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Figure 1: The opening screen of a problem
21
Figure 2: The first-stage decision
22
Figure 3: The second-stage decision
23
Figure 4: The weighting function behind Table 2 (g = 0.6)
24
Table 1: the problem set
Probability of Left at first stage: p
Probability of Left at second stage if Nature moves Left at first stage: p1
Probability of Left at second stage if Nature moves Right at first stage: p2
pn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
p .6 .7 .8 .6 .7 .8 .6 .7 .8 .6 .7 .8 .6 .7 .8 .6 .7 .8 .6 .7 .8 .6 .7 .8 .6 .7 .8
p1 .6 .6 .6 .7 .7 .7 .8 .8 .8 .6 .6 .6 .7 .7 .7 .8 .8 .8 .6 .6 .6 .7 .7 .7 .8 .8 .8
p2 .6 .6 .6 .6 .6 .6 .6 .6 .6 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8
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Table 2: An example of choices of the different types
Parameters assumed: r = 2.0 and g = 0.6
Probabilities Myopic Naive Resolute Sophisticated
pn m p p1 p2 x y z x y z x y z x y z
1 40 .60 .60 .60 20.00 10.00 10.00 25.55 12.78 7.22 25.55 18.33 7.22 20.00 10.00 10.00
2 40 .70 .60 .60 22.09 11.04 8.96 27.25 13.63 6.37 27.25 20.88 6.37 22.09 11.04 8.96
3 40 .80 .60 .60 27.60 13.80 6.20 28.88 14.44 5.56 28.88 23.32 5.56 27.60 13.80 6.20
4 40 .60 .70 .60 20.00 11.04 10.00 27.25 15.05 6.37 27.25 20.88 6.37 21.10 11.65 9.45
5 40 .70 .70 .60 22.09 12.19 8.96 29.14 16.09 5.43 29.14 23.72 5.43 22.63 12.49 8.69
6 40 .80 .70 .60 27.60 15.24 6.20 30.95 17.09 4.52 30.95 26.43 4.52 28.01 15.46 6.00
7 40 .60 .80 .60 20.00 13.80 10.00 28.88 19.93 5.56 28.88 23.32 5.56 24.69 17.04 7.65
8 40 .70 .80 .60 22.09 15.24 8.96 30.95 21.36 4.52 30.95 26.43 4.52 24.69 17.04 7.65
9 40 .80 .80 .60 27.60 19.04 6.20 32.92 22.71 3.54 32.92 29.38 3.54 29.23 20.17 5.38
10 40 .60 .60 .70 20.00 10.00 11.04 25.55 12.78 7.98 25.55 18.33 7.22 18.90 9.45 11.65
11 40 .70 .60 .70 22.09 11.04 9.89 27.25 13.63 7.04 27.25 20.88 6.37 18.90 9.45 11.65
12 40 .80 .60 .70 27.60 13.80 6.85 28.88 14.44 6.14 28.88 23.32 5.56 27.78 13.89 6.75
13 40 .60 .70 .70 20.00 11.04 11.04 27.25 15.05 7.04 27.25 20.88 6.37 22.09 12.19 9.89
14 40 .70 .70 .70 22.09 12.19 9.89 29.14 16.09 5.99 29.14 23.72 5.43 22.86 12.62 9.46
15 40 .80 .70 .70 27.60 15.24 6.85 30.95 17.09 5.00 30.95 26.43 4.52 28.18 15.56 6.53
16 40 .60 .80 .70 20.00 13.80 11.04 28.88 19.93 6.14 28.88 23.32 5.56 23.64 16.31 9.03
17 40 .70 .80 .70 22.09 15.24 9.89 30.95 21.36 5.00 30.95 26.43 4.52 25.62 17.68 7.94
18 40 .80 .80 .70 27.60 19.04 6.85 32.92 22.71 3.91 32.92 29.38 3.54 29.39 20.28 5.86
19 40 .60 .60 .80 20.00 10.00 13.80 25.55 12.78 9.97 25.55 18.33 7.22 15.31 7.65 17.04
20 40 .70 .60 .80 22.09 11.04 12.36 27.25 13.63 8.80 27.25 20.88 6.37 18.49 9.25 14.84
21 40 .80 .60 .80 27.60 13.80 8.56 29.02 14.51 7.58 29.02 23.32 5.70 27.80 13.90 8.42
22 40 .60 .70 .80 20.00 11.04 13.80 27.25 15.05 8.80 27.25 20.88 6.37 16.36 9.03 16.31
23 40 .70 .70 .80 22.09 12.19 12.36 29.14 16.09 7.49 29.14 23.72 5.43 24.26 13.39 10.86
24 40 .80 .70 .80 27.60 15.24 8.56 30.95 17.09 6.24 30.95 26.43 4.52 28.20 15.57 8.14
25 40 .60 .80 .80 20.00 13.80 13.80 28.88 19.93 7.67 28.88 23.32 5.56 25.49 17.59 10.01
26 40 .70 .80 .80 22.09 15.24 12.36 30.95 21.36 6.24 30.95 26.43 4.52 27.60 19.04 8.56
27 40 .80 .80 .80 27.60 19.04 8.56 32.92 22.71 4.89 32.92 29.38 3.54 29.41 20.29 7.31
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Table 3: Some simulation results
In this table, the true parameters are r = 2.0, g = 0.8 and s = 75.
100 iterations were carried out.
Table 3.1: Average maximised log-likelihoods
Estimated type
True type Myopic Naive Resolute Sophisticated
Myopic -1176.652 -1207.239 -1206.721 -1399.328
Naive -1483.576 -1090.090 -1464.342 -1496.232
Resolute -1625.063 -1525.753 -1127.111 -1676.821
Sophisticated -1515.027 -1383.583 -1484.399 -1203.517
Table 3.2: Standard deviations of maximised log-likelihoods
Estimated type
True type Myopic Naive Resolute Sophisticated
Myopic 104.555 107.222 102.854 100.557
Naive 91.467 117.712 95.693 175.103
Resolute 56.518 65.952 101.624 53.142
Sophisticated 91.404 101.615 94.493 209.33
Table 3.3: Number of times that an incorrect type is identified
Estimated type
True type Myopic Naive Resolute Sophisticated
Myopic 0 17 12 1
Naive 0 0 0 0
Resolute 0 0 0 0
Sophisticated 0 3 0 0
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Table 4: Fitted and actual decisions for subject 65
Myopic Naive Resolute Sophisticated Actual15
pn x y z x y z x y z x y z x y z
1 26.27 17.25 9.02 26.49 17.29 8.81 27.01 20.51 6.50 26.16 17.01 9.00 27 * 7
2 31.80 20.88 5.38 31.74 20.71 5.39 30.97 24.18 4.52 31.55 20.52 5.49 32 27 *
3 36.07 23.69 2.58 35.98 23.48 2.62 35.37 26.70 2.32 35.82 23.30 2.72 36 * 2
4 26.27 20.88 9.02 27.25 21.54 8.32 29.52 24.27 5.24 27.00 21.24 8.45 25 21 *
5 31.80 25.28 5.38 32.17 25.42 5.11 32.08 28.12 3.96 31.95 25.13 5.23 36 31 *
6 36.07 28.68 2.58 36.21 28.62 2.47 35.77 31.09 2.11 36.04 28.34 2.58 35 32 *
7 26.27 23.69 9.02 28.72 25.79 7.36 31.40 27.59 4.78 28.29 25.30 7.62 27 24 *
8 31.80 28.68 5.38 33.06 29.69 4.53 34.23 31.35 2.88 32.76 29.30 4.71 34 32 *
9 36.07 32.53 2.58 36.54 32.81 2.26 36.27 34.29 1.87 36.35 32.51 2.37 38 35 *
10 26.27 17.25 10.92 26.42 17.24 10.73 27.61 20.46 7.14 21.89 14.24 14.24 28 23 *
11 31.80 20.88 6.52 31.38 20.48 6.81 30.82 24.07 5.92 31.21 20.30 6.91 32 * 5
12 36.07 23.69 3.12 35.78 23.35 3.33 35.27 26.62 3.08 35.63 23.17 3.44 36 31 *
13 26.27 20.88 10.92 26.95 21.30 10.31 28.70 24.18 6.79 26.69 20.99 10.46 28 23 *
14 31.80 25.28 6.52 32.11 25.37 6.24 32.53 28.06 4.47 31.62 24.87 6.59 33 28 *
15 36.07 28.68 3.12 36.03 28.47 3.14 35.68 31.01 2.82 35.86 28.20 3.26 35 30 *
16 26.27 23.69 10.92 27.96 25.10 9.52 30.36 27.31 6.59 27.39 24.50 9.91 32 30 *
17 31.80 28.68 6.52 32.86 29.50 5.65 33.90 31.31 3.52 32.55 29.11 5.86 33 * 5
18 36.07 32.53 3.12 36.37 32.66 2.87 36.45 34.23 2.22 36.18 32.36 3.00 35 31 *
19 26.27 17.25 12.38 25.82 16.85 12.73 28.04 20.00 9.07 23.16 15.06 15.06 28 * 10
20 31.80 20.88 7.39 30.72 20.05 8.33 30.87 23.52 7.35 23.16 15.06 15.06 32 * 6
21 36.07 23.69 3.54 35.41 23.10 4.12 34.82 26.29 4.28 35.27 22.94 4.23 35 25 *
22 26.27 20.88 12.38 26.32 20.79 12.29 28.42 23.74 8.86 21.28 16.74 16.74 28 24 *
23 31.80 25.28 7.39 31.95 25.25 7.23 32.99 27.64 5.35 31.65 24.89 7.46 33 * 5
24 36.07 28.68 3.54 35.67 28.19 3.89 35.27 30.65 3.91 35.52 27.93 4.01 37 33 *
25 26.27 23.69 12.38 27.02 24.26 11.66 29.01 26.70 8.67 26.74 23.92 11.86 30 28 *
26 31.80 28.68 7.39 32.41 29.10 6.82 33.83 31.01 4.67 32.10 28.71 7.06 30 * 7
27 36.07 32.53 3.54 36.25 32.56 3.36 36.61 33.96 2.66 35.87 32.08 3.70 35 32 *
15 An asterisk indicates a missing observation (because of Nature’s move).
28
Table 5: A summary of the main results
All subjects Subjects for whom g parameter is
significantly different from 1 at 5%
for the best-fitting type
Type Number
of sub-
jects with
highest log-
likelihood
Number
of subjects
with signif-
icance on
Clarke Test
at 5%
Number
of subjects
with signif-
icance on
Clarke Test
at 1%
Overall Number
of subjects
with signif-
icance on
Clarke Test
at 5%
Number
of subjects
with signif-
icance on
Clarke Test
at 1%
Myopic 7 6 2 2 2 0
Naive 9 2 0 2 0 0
Resolute 39 22 17 24 18 14
Sophisticated 16 6 3 7 4 2
None of these 0 35 49 36 47 55
Total 71 71 71 71 71 71
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